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Chapter 5
Integrating Payouts: Annuity Design and
Public Pension Benefits in Mandatory
Defined Contribution Plans
Suzanne Doyle and John Piggott

Defined contribution (DC) style retirement systems have proliferated as
partial or complete substitutes for mandatory social security, spawning a
growing literature on their possible economic impacts, but associated payout structures have received surprisingly little attention. Nevertheless, DC
type retirement provision support and individual retirement accounts pose
special challenges for the payout phase. Adverse selection in the voluntary annuities market, prudential considerations, and the implications of
interactions between annuity payouts and first pillar type social welfare, all
suggest that DC retirement systems require some government regulation
regarding the nature of associated retirement benefits.
Unlike traditional DB funds, regulations and employer obligations associated with the accumulation phase typically expire at retirement, even if
pension options are offered by the accumulation fund. Any payout regulations must therefore be separately stipulated. In practice, a range of
options is specified, ranging from lumpsum withdrawal to full annuitization,
sometimes subject to the personal circumstances of the retiree.
This chapter focuses on the design of annuities and similar retirement
income instruments. It is especially concerned with interactions between
annuity preference and underlying publicly provided safety net support.
Because DC-type plans expose individuals to investment and inflation risk,
governments often provide guarantees on pension fund benefits, as well
as non-means tested transfers to the retired. These influence not only the
choice of accumulation portfolio, but also the choice of retirement product,
through providing a retirement income floor. They further complicate the
analysis of annuity and retirement income markets.

The authors are grateful to conference participants, especially Zvi Bodie, Olivia Mitchell, and
Andrew Samwick for comments. Lance Fisher, Geoffrey Kingston, Sachi Purcal, and Mike
Sherris provided comments and discussion on earlier drafts. They acknowledge financial support from the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan,
and the Australian Research Council. All opinions remain the authors’ own.
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We focus on the interaction between private sources of retirement income
and first pillar government transfers. Two forms of government support are
modeled: a ‘‘pension guarantee,’’ which is withdrawn dollar for dollar with
the private payout, and a non-means-tested public pension offered to all
retirees at a flat rate. Results emphasize the welfare impacts of alternatives
under a range of income assumptions. A number of themes emerge. First,
for most retirees, annuities that expose the retiree to investment risk are preferred to annuities guaranteeing certain payments, when the government
shares the investment risk by guaranteeing a minimum pension. Second, on
an expected basis, in the lower range of wealth accumulations, which characterize an immature mandatory retirement system, these products may
generate a lower expected government payout than life annuities offering
full investment risk coverage. Third, inflation-protected annuity products
are highly valued, especially by the rich and risk-averse, though except for
the poor, inflation indexed products yielded lower expected public liabilities. This is because over time, the real value of the level annuity can more
quickly erode to the point where a pension guarantee is activated. Finally,
some products which offer partial longevity insurance such as phased withdrawals may be preferred by consumers to full longevity insurance products,
but the former are often associated with high levels of implied government
liability.
We begin by detailing the retirement products we consider and present
our modeling approach. We conclude by reporting estimates of consumer preference toward alternative products, along with their budgetary
implications.

Characterizing Retirement Income Products
For modeling purposes, we focus on five different retirement income instruments, cover alternative patterns of exposure to longevity, investment, and
inflation risks:
1. Level Life Annuities. These provide insurance against longevity risk and
guarantee a certain payment per period, thus insuring against investment risk. But payments are fixed in nominal terms, so annuitants are
fully exposed to inflation risk.
2. Variable Annuities. These provide insurance against longevity risk, while
at the same time delivering higher expected returns by transferring
investment risk to the annuitant. The annuity is written on the basis of
an assumed investment return (AIR). Payouts, however, are adjusted
by the relationship between the performance of the underlying portfolio, which may be specified by the annuitant, and the AIR. Because
investment risk is borne by the annuitant, the AIR may be significantly
higher than the risk-free rate.
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3. Inflation-indexed Annuities. Even a modest inflation rate of 3.5 percent
will halve purchasing power in 20 years. Combined with 1-percent
wage productivity growth, purchasing power relative to community
standards will halve in 16 years. For a retiree with a life expectancy of
15 or more years, as a male retiring at sixty-five would have in most
OECD countries, erosion of purchasing power through inflation is
thus a significant risk. For longer-lived women, the risk is even greater.
While escalated annuities partially address this problem, they do not
offer insurance against unanticipated inflation, which may be a larger
danger to annuitant welfare.
4. Term Annuities. It is possible to purchase an annuity, which provides a
guaranteed income stream for a specified period. This kind of product
is available for retirement provision in some countries, with a long
term. In our calculations, we assume life expectancy as the term set.
This product does offer insurance against investment risk, but it offers
no longevity insurance.
5. Phased withdrawals. The phased withdrawal appears at first sight to be
more like a pure investment instrument than a retirement income
stream product. Its essence is that a sum of money is invested at
retirement, in a portfolio over whose composition the retiree has considerable control. Both income and capital can be drawn down to meet
the retiree’s needs. The drawdowns, however, are limited to a range,
with both upper and lower bounds. These are often set such that the
upper bound carries with it an expectation of an even income flow
until the life expectancy of the retiree at the point of retirement. The
lower bound is set so that withdrawals can be made until the actuarial
probability of survival from the date of purchase approximates zero.
These ‘‘valuation factors’’ apply to the account accumulation each year.

Retirement Income Payout Streams and
First Pillar Benefits
We use a stochastic numerical simulation approach to study consumer preference and government budgetary implications of a number of stylized
annuity type payout instruments offered in countries with mandatory DC
retirement systems. For convenience, Australian data are used to specify the
accumulation, risk-return, and longevity parameters of the model, since this
is one of the few developed countries with a fully fledged private DC-type
mandatory retirement system. But we consider policy specifications, which
are quite general, including some not in operation in Australia.
Calculations of the income flows associated with our menu of annuities are
based on variants of standard actuarial formulae. We incorporate stochastic
processes for both inflation and real rate of investment returns by assuming
that these follow geometric Brownian motion. Assuming that there is no
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borrowing or lending, these income flows along with stochastic inflation
allow us to calculate real consumption in each period in retirement.
The indices associated with both inflation and investment variables grow
at trend rates, which are continuously disturbed by random shocks. This
‘‘proportional random walk’’ implies that the volatility of the time path is
proportional to the level of the associated index. We further assume that the
inflation and real investment return processes are independent.1 Each of
the reported experiments is based on 5,000 draws from a standard normal
distribution.
The simulations reported here assume three retirement accumulations,
of $100,000, $200,000, and $300,000, to represent low, medium, and high
income levels. A full-time worker on average earnings might be expected to
accumulate between $150,000 and $200,000 at retirement age 65.2 These
accumulations differentially impact on first-pillar support. For the payout
phase, we have assumed a real safe rate of return of 3.5 percent, an expected
inflation rate of 3.5 percent, a risky rate of return of 10 percent, and real
wage growth of 1 percent. The current real return on a 20-year indexed government bond is 3.68 percent. While inflation over the last century has
averaged 4 percent, existing long-term inflation forecasts are somewhat
lower; changed Central Bank policy is sometimes appealed to in defense
of these lower figures.
The above values imply an equity premium of 3 percent. This may be
low by conventional standards, but in a very thorough study, Siegel (1992)
argues that over the last two centuries, the equity premium may have been
closer to 3--4 percent than to the 6--7 percent range frequently used. He
suggests that the high equity premium observed over the sixty-five years to
1990 was due primarily to depressed rates of return on fixed income assets,
and that it is unlikely to endure in the future. Because of the long time
horizons involved, we have chosen a conservative equity premium estimate.
In the stochastic simulations, the return on equities is assumed to have a
standard deviation of 0.2. Inflation is assumed to have a standard deviation
of 0.02.
Mortality is specified using Australian population survival probabilities,
which are compiled by the Australian Government Actuary (1994) every
5 years. For this analysis we use the 1995--97 life tables, modified to reflect
the projected cohort mortality improvements that a 65-year-old purchasing
an annuity now might experience over time. Australian mortality is close to
the OECD norms.
The first pillar payouts are specified to 25 percent of male average weekly
earnings, of about $40,000 a year in Australia (2000). The first pillar is thus
indexed to wage growth. The 25 percent calibration is consistent with the
levels of pension guarantee offered in Switzerland and Chile, and it is also
the approximate value of the full ‘‘Age Pension’’ in Australia. In our central
case, the guarantee is withdrawn dollar-for-dollar with annuity payments.
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These amounts are indexed to wage growth, assumed here to be 4.5 percent
nominal.

Results
One way of assessing efficacy of annuity products involves comparing their
payout structures at different points in time. Direct comparison of income
streams generated by different annuity products offers only a limited guide
to their value to consumers, however. Of greater importance are individual
preferences toward alternative income (or consumption) profiles. In assessing the effectiveness of alternative policies, economists often base their
recommendations on metrics associated with individual welfare, or utility.
This approach is readily adapted to the present problem. We adjust the
income flows, which different annuity types yield for assumed inflation.
Income-tested public sector first pillar payments are then added in. The
resulting real income in each period is assumed to finance consumption
in that period alone---there is no borrowing or lending in retirement, and
no other source of income. This gives an estimate of consumption for each
period, and provides the basis for the utility score calculation.3
In what follows, we assume a 65-year-old Australian male retires in 2000,
having accumulated a retirement benefit throughout his working life.
For simplicity, we focus on three income levels, which we represent by
the annuity purchase price, and we use male average cohort life expectancy, an assumption justified by mandatory annuity purchase.4 Table 5-1
reports product-by-product equivalent variations (EVs) for the five retirement income products identified above, in the policy context of a pension
guarantee equal to 25 percent of average earnings, offset dollar-for-dollar
with private retirement income. The interpretation of the EVs is that they
give an estimate of how much an individual would have to pay as a lump
sum, at the point of retirement, to make him indifferent between a level life
annuity and the alternative. In each case, we assume that only one alternative is available, and that purchase is mandatory, avoiding issues of potential
adverse or differential selection across products.
It is convenient to begin by pointing out the salient characteristics of
the income streams generated by the menu of products considered here.
Longevity insurance offered by the level life annuity, the variable annuity, and the CPI indexed annuity, means that there is no sudden drop in
income late in retirement. This is, however, present in the case of the term
nominal annuity, and to some degree also with the phased withdrawal.5 A
rather different pattern of income variation is implied by instruments, which
expose the purchaser to investment risk. The variable annuity offers longevity risk cover but investment risk exposure; the phased withdrawal exposes
the purchaser to both risks.
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TABLE 5-1 Consumer Welfare and Public Liability for Alternative Retirement
Payout Products (Individual Male aged 65)
First Year
Annuity
Income
($)

First Year
Total
γ = 0.5
Income
($)

EV ($)
γ =5

γ = 10

PV ($)
Pension
Guarantee
Payouts

A: Purchase Price $ 100,000
Nominal
10,976
Variable
15,613
CPI-indexed
8,394
Term
10,719
Phased withdrawal 10,723

10,976
15,626
10,273
10,721
11,174

n/a
n/a
59,089 39,384
−6,519 −7,007
−2,333 −2,357
26,285 15,599

n/a
30,312
−7,376
−2,366
10,483

33,934
30,242
33,286
48,033
44,887

B: Purchase Price $ 200,000
Level
21,951
Variable
31,226
CPI-indexed
16,788
Term
21,438
Phased withdrawal 21,401

21,951
31,226
16,788
21,438
21,401

n/a
n/a
n/a
79,530
4,335 −20,988
−3,409 19,430
55,447
−5,383 −6,904
−9,098
13,118 −25,057 −41,472

3,747
11,745
0
27,949
20,241

C: Purchase Price $ 300,000
Level
32,927
Variable
46,839
CPI-indexed
25,181
Term
32,157
Phased withdrawal 32,168

32,927
46,839
25,181
32,157
32,168

n/a
n/a
n/a
103,713 −48,703 −88,152
1,181 54,100 153,035
−18,831 −61,086 −91,226
1,149 −84,579 −112,207

505
6,284
0
27,933
12,867

Source: Authors’ computations.

The first message from Table 5-1 is the high value placed on the variable
annuity by low-income individuals, or by those with low risk aversion. The
variable annuity offers a significantly higher expected rate of return, and this
is a preferred product for those who are less risk averse, or for low-income
individuals heavily reliant on government benefit. Equally important is the
pattern of government liabilities reported in the right hand column of the
table. Again, for low-income individuals, the expected present value of government payout for the variable annuity is less than for the level annuity, and
also for all other retirement instruments we consider. This occurs because at
low incomes, the higher expected payouts from the variable annuity reduce
government liability relative to instruments, which offer insurance across
more dimensions of retirement risk. These latter instruments offer a lower
payout than the expected income from a variable annuity.
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For the more risk-averse high income groups, however, the variable annuity comes last. For these individuals, there is little downside protection from
government support, because their expected retirement incomes lie above
the safety net range. At the same time, their preferences are specified so
that they have an intense aversion to income volatility resulting form the
exposure to investment risk associated with a variable annuity. The CPIindexed annuity is the preferred retirement instrument for the rich and
risk-averse. The strong preference in our calculations for this annuity type,
compared with market experience, where demand is consistently reported
to be weak, is surprising. One possible explanation is that CPI-indexed annuities are offered with far higher loadings in the commercial market than level
annuities, which inhibits demand.6
In general, the term annuity fares worst in terms of its appeal to consumers. This is probably because there is no consistency of exposure to
volatility over time. For the first 15 years, a safe, smooth return is offered;
this appeals to the very risk averse, while those less averse to risk miss out on
the higher expected returns generated by products associated with riskier
portfolios. After that time, there is a considerable movement in consumption flows, which the risk averse dislike. No matter how preference toward
risk is specified, this product has unattractive features. Furthermore, the
public pension payout associated with term annuity purchase is much higher
than for the level life annuity. This product may, of course, score better if a
bequest argument were incorporated into the preference function.
Given our ‘‘medium’’ assumption over phased withdrawal drawdown, the
first year payout from the allocated annuity is not particularly high. But the
EVs are such that the allocated annuity ranks second overall to the variable
annuity, given a purchase price of $200,000. However, as with the term
annuity, the expected present value of public pension payments are high,
given that the retiree relies on these payments as their only income source
later in life.
It is difficult to capture the phased withdrawal’s appeal in the preference framework used here. It generates a significant value of expected
bequests, and also leaves considerable discretion over capital drawdown
for the duration of life expectancy. Neither of these features is captured in
our preference function, yet both are valued by individuals.
Table 5-1 reports results that are substantively different in the degree to
which first pillar support might be relied upon. For the base $200,000 case,
Figures 5-1 and 5-2 reveal this clearly. The non-indexed annuity streams
remain flat over time, but when combined with first pillar payouts, total
retirement income increases over time as the increasing pension guarantee
comes into play for the latter stages of the annuity payout.
Sensitivity of our findings to changes in the assumed values of parameters
is reported in Table 5-2. The safe real rate of return and the expected rate
of inflation are varied for the base case of a $200,000 accumulation. Results
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Figure 5-1. Expected annuity income paths. (Source: Author’s computations.)
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Figure 5-2. Expected total income paths with pension guarantee. (Source: Author’s
computations.)

suggest that first-year annuity payouts are quite robust across these ranges.
When we turn to EV calculations, however, we find that some results are
highly sensitive to the values of parameters assumed. Their interpretation
requires a recognition that the payouts reflect both annuity income and
first pillar government benefits. In most cases, rankings do not alter. Where
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TABLE 5-2 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis: Inflation and Rate of Return
2.5%
First Year
Income ($)

4.5%
EV ($)

γ = 1.5

γ =5

First Year
Income ($)

EV ($)
γ = 1.5

γ =5

A: Safe rate of return
Level
20,382
Variable
31,226
CPI-indexed
15,398
Term
20,154
Phased
21,401
withdrawal

n/a
n/a
74,358
20,070
−5,017
9,779
−2,618 −3,059
16,331 −11,586

23,542
31,226
18,284
22,752
21,401

n/a
n/a
37,526 −9,474
6,388 28,665
−8,560 −11,305
−12,710 −36,880

B: Inflation rate
Level
Variable
CPI-indexed
Term
Phased
withdrawal

n/a
n/a
53,328
1,244
2,046
13,438
−5,321 −8,548
2 −26,959

23,542
33,159
16,954
22,752
21,525

n/a
n/a
55,412
6,798
−1,049 26,064
−6,885 −7,162
601 −23,281

20,382
29,320
16,643
20,154
21,278

Source: Authors’ computations.
Notes: Results reported for $200,000 premium, male 65-year old purchase.

reversals do occur, the explanation can in most cases be found in the relative impacts on first pillar support of relative changes in the payouts of the
annuities.
EV values also appear highly sensitive to changes in the underlying real
safe rate. The mechanism here relates to the level annuity benchmark. As
the safe rate moves up or down, the relative importance of inflation and the
equity premium change. For example, in the case of the variable annuity,
an increase in the safe rate from 2.5 to 4.5 percent reduces the EV by half
for individuals with γ set equal to 1.5, and reverses the ordering when γ is
set equal to 5.
Because pension guarantee benefits are indexed to the real wage, the
CPI insured instruments do best in limiting public liability, except for the
low accumulation group. This public liability associated with non-indexed
benefits increases with the expected inflation rate. For expected inflation
of 4.5 percent, for example, the expected public liability associated with
the variable annuity is $16,000, compared with $11,745 in the standard
specification. As well, increases in the real safe rate reduce expected public
outlays for instruments whose payouts are based upon safe returns. A level
annuity is associated with an expected present value payout of $2,760 if
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TABLE 5-3 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis: Equity Premium and Maximum
Drawdown ($200,000 premium, male)
Equity Premium 4%
First Year
Income ($)
Level
Variable
CPI-indexed
Term

EV ($)

21,951
33,104
16,823
21,438

γ = 1.5

γ =5

n/a
66,716
1,385
−5,632

n/a
10,688
20,266
−6,904

Max Drawdown Phased
Withdrawal Annuity
First Year
Income ($)
21,951
31,226
16,823
21,438

EV ($)
γ = 1.5

γ =5

n/a
54,742
1,385
−5,632

n/a
4,335
20,266
−6,904

Source: Authors’ computations.
Note: Results reported for $ 200,000 premium, male 65-year old purchase.

TABLE 5-4 Summary of outcomes for universal pension: Male $ 200,000

Level
Variable
CPI-indexed
Term
Phased
withdrawal

First Year
Annuity
Payout
($)

First Year
Total
Payout
($)

EV ($)

PV ($)
Universal
Pension

21,951
31,226
16,823
21,438
21,401

32,221
41,496
27,093
31,708
31,671

n/a
n/a
n/a
69,620 −27,025 −81,084
147
9,817
24,197
−33,738 −114,196 −154,757
−5,246 −68,489 −107,324

133,165
133,165
133,165
133,165
133,165

Source: Authors’ computations.
Note: Results reported for $ 200,000 premium, male 65-year old purchase.

the real safe rate is 4.5 percent, compared with $3,747 in the central case
specification. First year annuity payout variation, while small, can lead to
major differences in first pillar liability.
Table 5-3 reports results from two further variations on our central case
specification. Increasing the equity premium leads to higher payouts for
instruments relying on risky portfolios. Altering the drawdown pattern of
the phased withdrawal changes early year payouts, but also the later year
reduction in private income.
Finally, we turn in Table 5-4 to consider the impact of a universal pension
to sit beneath private retirement income, rather than a minimum pension
guarantee, in which benefits are withdrawn dollar-for-dollar. The clearest
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Figure 5-3. Expected total income paths with universal pension. (Source: Author’s
computations.)

impact is that government benefits and therefore retirement income flows,
are higher across a wider range of wealth accumulations. These government
benefits become more important later in life, as Figure 5-3 indicates.
Consumer preference across annuity types varies with this alternative first
pillar design. The variable annuity retains its ranking as the most preferred
product for the cases we consider, even though the risk-sharing inherent in
the pension guarantee design considered earlier is no longer present. But
the replacement of a guarantee with a fixed demogrant does reduce the
desirability of the phased withdrawal, whose ranking across the five alternatives drops to fourth. Otherwise, however, the consumer preference ordering
across products is the same as that generated in the pension guarantee case.

Conclusion
This chapter investigates the consumer preference and government budget
implications of alternative annuity designs in a private mandatory retirement provision environment. We assume a retirement policy framework in
which mandatory DC accumulations are paid out at retirement, and regulations over retirement income streams must be separately stipulated. A social
welfare safety net is assumed, in which either a minimum pension is guaranteed by the government, or a universal social welfare payment is provided.
The minimum pension is similar in broad structure to the US Supplemental
Security Income Program (see for example Daly and Burkhauser, forthcoming), which offers a transfer to elderly US citizens or permanent residents
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equal to about 25 percent of average full time earnings, subject to income
and assets means tests.
The insurance coverage and payout profiles of several different annuity
products are considered. Numerical simulation of annuity payouts for a
65-year-old male, in the presence of longevity, investment, and inflation risk,
is used to gain insight into the implications for social welfare benefits and
consumer preference valuation of alternative products by the retiree. We
find that with a minimum pension guarantee, the variable annuity is the most
preferred of all the annuities we study, for a broad band of accumulation
levels and degrees of risk aversion. In some cases, the expected government
outlays associated with first pillar obligations are also lower. These findings
hold only for the lower accumulation groups, but in a policy context, these
are perhaps the most important. Annuity mandation, and concern about
government responsibility for individual welfare in retirement, is unlikely
to be focussed on the rich.
Another broad finding is that inflation insured annuity products are
popular, especially with the rich and risk-averse. As well, except for the
poor, inflation-indexed products yield lower expected public liabilities than
most other products. Finally, non-life instruments, especially when tied to
risky investments, are popular, but they tend to be quite expensive for
government revenue.
This chapter considers only two first-pillar safety net designs, which could
be seen as two extremes between a variety of alternative tapered benefit
structures. Other research not detailed here suggests that tapered benefits extend to higher income ranges the pattern of consumer preference
and public outlays we report for the guarantee case. Extensions to our
research could embrace alternative portfolio specifications, including especially portfolio insurance and protective put strategies, which offer some
protection against downside risk; multiple individuals; and the implications
of a preference specification in which habit formation is incorporated.

Notes
1 Australia and Switzerland are among the developed nations to adopt mandatory

policies, while among developing economies, Chile has the most mature system.
More than a dozen countries, mostly from Latin America and the transition economies of central Europe, have either mandated private retirement provision or have
stated their intention to undertake such reform. Further, a number of developed
countries have either reformed their pension systems in this direction (e.g., the
United Kingdom) or have debated doing so (the United States).
2 This assumption is supported by evidence on the United Kingdom, Canada, and
West Germany (Ely and Robinson, 1989), which suggests that in the short term, the
correlation between the real stock return and the inflation rate are not significantly
different from zero. Similar results hold for the Australian economy (Crosby, 1998).
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3 A worker on average earnings, who had been in full time employment continuously for 35 years to retirement in 2000, contributing 9 percent of earnings (the
Australian mandatory rate), would have accumulated about $160,000 at retirement. Bateman and Piggott (1999) provide an account of the Australian mandatory
Defined Contribution system, the Superannuation Guarantee.
4 We assume a standard iso-elastic utility function, which allows for the incorporation
of varying degrees of risk aversion.
5 The possibility of reversion of the annuity to a spouse is ignored. Further, we ignore
taxation and government benefit provisions, which specifically favor one annuity
type over another.
6 Our baseline drawdown assumption for the phased withdrawal is set halfway
between the two extremes. In Table 4-4, we report the case of a phased withdrawal
with maximum drawdown. This generates the same ‘‘over-the-cliff’’ drop as for the
term annuity.
7 This may be because of accentuated self selection in the indexed annuity market
(only those with very long life expectancies care about inflation indexation), or
because of a lack of long-dated indexed securities to provide insurers with suitable
immunization against inflation risk.
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